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THE POLICY AND TARGETS OF CRIMINAL
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA AND THE
UNITED STATES
Haiyan Liu †
Abstract: This comparative study analyzes the targets, consequences, and
influence factors of the criminal enforcement of intellectual property rights in the United
States and China. The analysis reveals unexpected consequences when transplanting
Western intellectual property law in Chinese contexts. Similarities in criminal
enforcement between the two countries indicate that economic factors that are
determinant forces in both the United States and China. These factors include such
business practices as: (1) vehement business lobbying and the capture of enforcement
agencies by top trademark corporations; (2) the size and market concentration level of top
firms in an industry; and (3) trade association lobbying efforts, including foreign
copyright associations exerting pressure on China.
Political factors also influence criminal enforcement in China. These factors
include: (1) state interference to protect tax interests in tobacco and alcohol industries; (2)
public policies to fight against counterfeits that pose health and safety threats; and (3)
other political goals, such as control of the media and importation restrictions on
publications.
In order to promote IPR protection while reducing business capture, instrumental
usage by the state, and unequal enforcement, this article recommends China (1) develop
IP-related industries, (2) cultivate the IPR consciousness of citizens and companies, (3)
establish respect for rights and rules, (4) encourage the mobilization of private rights by
private entities, (5) allow citizen supervision of governmental activities, and (6) move
from proactive administrative and criminal enforcement to civil enforcement.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Several converging trends place tremendous pressure on countries to
criminalize intellectual property (“IP”) infringement. For one, IP assets are
becoming an evermore valuable and powerful component of the economy.1
†

Assistant Professor, University of Macau. Thanks to Phil Parnell, Ethan Michelson, Richard
Gruner, Henry Pontell, Lening Zhang, Kip Schlegel, Hal Pepinsky, Tim Ginsberg, Peter Yu, Nicholas
Howson, Scott Kennedy, Michael Grossberg, Ying Wu, Wenling Liu, Ivan Sun, Doris Chu, Mingxiu Wu,
as well as the OYCF Annual Meetings at the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Chicago;
the Intellectual Property Development in China Conference at the Intellectual Property Law Center at
Drake University Law School; the colloquium at the Center of Law, Society and Culture, School of Law at
Indiana University–Bloomington; Law and Society annual meetings; and American Society of Criminology
annual meetings for comments on prior drafts.
1
See ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION AND THE U.S. PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE REPORT, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: INDUSTRIES IN
FOCUS, (2012), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/publications/IP_Report_March_2012.pdf.
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Additionally, technological advances make it increasingly easier to create,
replicate, market, and distribute IP-containing products on a global scale,
even as the same technologies enable pervasive and escalating infringement.
Copyright piracy and trademark counterfeiting occurs in a variety of
markets, from music, movies, outfits, shoes, toys, cigarettes, and alcohol to
much more sophisticated products, such as automobile parts and medicine.2
In response, businesses in intellectual property rights (“IPR”)-intensive
industries have promoted the criminalization of IP infringement, especially
in the United States and China—the two largest economies in the world.
This article seeks to illuminate the current enforcement foci, patterns,
consequences, and extra-legal forces of criminal IP enforcement in the
United States and China. Under the influence of several dominant economic
and political factors, there is an overrepresentation in Chinese criminal IP
cases of few top foreign companies, state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”) in
state-controlled industries, products carrying health or safety threats, and
other regulated industries such as the publishing industry. These results aid
in evaluating the fairness and the level and state of democracy in politically
motivated enforcement, and provide a basis for policy recommendations for
enforcement reform. This research is the first to systematically describe and
empirically analyze multiple aspects of the criminal enforcement of IPR in
China as compared to the United States.
Part II of this article highlights the importance of the comparison of IP
enforcement in China and the United States. It introduces the law and
society theoretical paradigms inspiring the analysis. Part II also provides an
overview of the most prominent forces shaping the overall strengths of IPR
enforcement in China and the United States. The literature review of
previous studies covers literature on the criminal enforcement of IPR in both
the United States and China and empirical research on IP protection and
enforcement in China.
Part III depicts the major research questions and explains data
sources, types, and research methods. Part IV presents detailed description,
interpretation, and discussion of important empirical findings and their
implications.
Part V considers implications of these findings for
understanding the criminal enforcement of IPR, as well as larger issues of
legal transplantation and law and development in an Asian and authoritarian
2

See Annette D. Beresford, Christian Desilets, Sandy Haantz, John Kane & April Wall, Intellectual
Property and White-collar Crime: Report of Issues, Trends, and Problems for Future Research, in
COMBATING PIRACY: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY THEFT AND FRAUD 73–94 (Jay S. Albanese, ed., 2006).
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state such as China. It also discusses how the findings contribute to
generalizing causal and acting forces for the strength and foci of IPR
enforcement in a country. Finally, Part VI discusses further policy
implications of the findings.
II.

BACKGROUND AND THEORY

A.

The Significance of IP Enforcement in China and the United States

This study is a comparison of China and the United States. IPR
enforcement in China generated broad interest across a range of professions
and political perspectives due to the salience of IP, the immense size of the
Chinese market, and the increasing technology transfer between China and
the rest of the world.3 The prolonged and unusually high rates of piracy and
counterfeiting in China since the 1980s (see Figure 1) have irritated and
baffled the United States. For years, the United States has put China on the
priority watch list in the Special 301 Report prepared annually by the Office
of the United States Trade Representative. 4 The Special 301 Report
identifies a list of "Priority Foreign Countries," which include those judged
to have inadequate intellectual property laws. In addition, the report
contains a "Priority Watch List" and a "Watch List," containing countries
whose intellectual property regimes are deemed of concern.5

3

ANDREW C. MERTHA, THE POLITICS OF PIRACY; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN CHINA 1-34 (2005).
INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 84–85 (2009), available at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2009/2009SPEC301PRC.pdf.
5
Id.
4
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Figure 1. PC Software Piracy Rates (in Percentages) in China,
1994–20086

Tension in trade between the United States and China escalated when,
in 2007, the United States initiated a complaint against China in front of the
World Trade Organization (“WTO”) dispute settlement body concerning
China’s lack of protection and enforcement of IPR. 7 The WTO panel
rejected the claim by the United States regarding China’s allegedlyinadequate criminal enforcement of IPR.8 The WTO panel found the United

6

See BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE REPORT, EIGHTH ANNUAL BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY
STUDY: TRENDS IN SOFTWARE PIRACY 1994 THROUGH 2002 8 (2003), http://www.bsa.org/~/media/Files/R
esearch%20Papers/GlobalStudy/2003/IPR_Global Study2003.pdf (last visited October 2, 2014) [hereinafter
BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE]; BUSINESS SOFTWARE ALLIANCE REPORT, SIXTH ANNUAL BSA AND IDC
GLOBAL SOFTWARE PIRACY STUDY 12 (2009), http://global.bsa.org/globalpiracy2008/studies/
globalpiracy2008.pdf (last visited October 2, 2014) [hereinafter SIXTH ANNUAL BSA REPORT]. According
to BSA reports, software piracy rates are the known percentage of pirated PC-packaged software out of the
total amount of PC-packaged software installed that year. See SIXTH ANNUAL BSA REPORT, supra at 17.
7
See PANEL REPORT, CHINA—MEASURES AFFECTING THE PROTECTION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 119-25, WT/DS362/R (Jan. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report]; Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89
NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1056-1069 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute],
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1676558.
8
See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 7, at 119–25; Yu, The TRIPS
Enforcement Dispute, supra note 7, at 1046, 1068–69.
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States did not provide credible and sufficient data to prove the case.9 Most
of the press articles the United States provided as evidence were based on
speculation, anecdotal comments, or random information concerning a
particular high-profile case.10
The United States has enacted new legislation, modified sentencing
guidelines, and initiated large-scale political enforcement campaigns and
coordination to expand criminalization. 11 However, criminal prosecution
and sanctions remain a tiny percentage of the overall volume of civil IP
infringement disputes going through the judicial system each year.12 Such a
consistent but moderate criminalization trend might be due to the existence
of fairly effective civil remedies combined with the criminal justice system’s
the lack of institutional capacity and the low political priority of the issue
compared to other, more urgent, law and order problems.
China provides an important example of the dynamics of legal
transplantation: the indigenization and appropriation of the Anglo-American
IPR model in the local context of Chinese society. The ongoing
transplantation of IP law to China is part of the “rule of law project”
promoted by the United States in developing countries, similar to the law
and development movement in the 1970s.13 The U.S. case represents the
original IPR concepts and legal model growing out of classical liberalistic
and individualistic ideas. It makes sense to compare the two in order to
detect the unique characteristics of legal appropriation and modification
manifested through IPR enforcement in China as well as factors within the
contexts where legal change takes place.

9

See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 7, at 119–25; Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement
Dispute, supra note 7, at 1046, 1068–69.
10
See TRIPS Enforcement Panel Report, supra note 7, at 119–25; Yu, The TRIPS
Enforcement Dispute, supra note 7, at 1046, 1068–69.
11
See Haiyan Liu, The Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China and the United States:
Law & Society and Criminological Perspectives 147-68 (May 4, 2012) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Indiana University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United
States].
12
Id. at 171-75.
13
See generally Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred
Schools Contend: Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 472-75 (2002).
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Theoretical Approaches: Law and Society Paradigms and Legal
Transplant Theory

B.

Law and society literature offers important insights and analytical
paradigms for analyzing the story of China’s IP law transplantation. In the
past, legal pluralist studies advocated using the power of state law to
modernize and fundamentally change indigenous social orders. 14 More
recently, others have pointed out that this social reform role of state law is
limited.15
According to James Gardner’s law and development classic, the U.S.
legal models transplanted to Latin America in the 70s was marginally
impacted the U.S. law and development programs.16 Transplanted models
encountered strong resistance from local legal cultures, particularly from
established legal institutions and personnel.17 Bits and pieces of the U.S.
legal models were accepted only when there were similar internal legal
changes already underway. These new legal elements reinforced and
interacted with each other, taking on directions not necessarily intended or
expected. 18 Gardner’s findings manifest the importance of studying the
impact of indigenous contextual factors, situational characteristics, and
institutional arrangements on legal reform and indigenization.19
The stream of globalization has been accompanied by the
transplantation of transnational business law and transnational legal culture.
However, according to legal pluralist Brian Tamanaha, transplanted law does
not necessarily mirror indigenous norms or social conditions as is the case in
China.20 Transnational commercial rules derive from external market-based
economic interests and concerns, which often are in conflict with local
norms and practices. Some transnational commercial rules are developed to
promote business interests or to restrict or avoid the state’s power to control
14

Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 868, 874 (1988).
See generally id.; Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-autonomous
Social Field As an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719, 742-45 (1973); Dennis
O. Lynch, Hundred Months of Solitude: Myth or Reality in Law and Development?, 8 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 223 (1983); JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND
FOREIGN AID IN LATIN AMERICA 239–46 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1980).
16
JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID IN LATIN
AMERICA 239–46 (Univ. of Wis. Press 1980).
17
Id.
18
See generally Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11.
19
Id.
20
BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY 106–32
(Oxford Univ. Press 2001).
15
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economic affairs within its sovereignty.21 Since IPR is an important part of
the transnational business law, Tamanaha’s arguments can also apply to IP
laws and enforcement model transplanted to China.
Tamanaha suggests another reason law does not mirror society is the
expansion of administrative law. 22 The majority of IP infringements in
China are processed by administrative agencies, such as the Administration
of Industry and Commerce (“SAIC”) and Copyright Bureau. Applying
Tamanaha’s arguments, these administrative IP laws, regulations, and
policies could often be used as instruments to balance interests and promote
policies and social changes, rather than reflect social norms.23
According to Tamanaha, “[w]hen mirroring is low and
monopolization is high, the law will be more subject to capture and
instrumental use by select groups, especially the economic or political elite
(often including the legal professionals).”24 On the one hand, in the context
of IP enforcement in China, the state and enforcement agencies could
directly incorporate indigenous norms or politically prioritized goals into IP
law enforcement. On the other hand, top corporations, their IP attorneys,
and trade associations might get involved in the capture and instrumental use
of the IP enforcement system through agency participation.
Macro-level factors Shaping IPR Enforcement in China and the
United States

C.

Through review of IP as well as law and society literature, and
theoretical analysis, this article identifies three major macro-level factors
that shape the main mechanisms and levels of IPR enforcement in the United
States and China.25 These factors are: (1) divergent views of human nature,
property rights, and intellectual products within each country; (2) the
different stages of economic prosperity and technology development; and (3)
the general purpose and level of independence of the countries’ judicial
systems, especially economic law systems.

21
22
23
24
25

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11, at 95–112.
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The cultural and political ideologies behind justifications of IPR differ
in China and the United States.26 William Fisher concludes that one of the
most important mainstream justifications of IPR in the United States is John
Locke’s labor theory and his notion of possessive individualism. 27
Additionally, Robert Merges argues that it was inconclusive whether social
utilitarianism, as laid out by the U.S. Constitution, justified IPR protection.28
Instead, Merges recognizes “(1) Lockean (‘labor theory’ of) appropriation
and (2) Kantian (liberal) individualism” as the fundamental principles of IP
law. According to Merges, Kant emphasizes “the unique contribution of
each creative person” in producing IP and, thus, the state acknowledges
individual freedom and autonomy by recognizing IPR. 29 Continuing this
individualistic and liberalistic tone, the discourse of “romantic authorship”
arose in the mid- to late-eighteenth century. In this view of creative work as
property, not only the “labor” but also the “originality” and personality of
the author justifies his ownership of his literary expression.30 Both labor
theory and “romantic authorship” are deeply rooted in the Anglo-American
individualistic assumption about human nature and the relationship between
humankind and the environment.31
In contrast, the Chinese indigenous worldview—dominated by holistic
conceptions of human nature, humankind and the environment,
rights/entitlements, and intellectual products 32 —differs from the Western
individualistic, classical liberalistic approaches to property rights.33 More

26

See generally id.
William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL
THEORY OF PROPERTY 170–74 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2001).
28
Compare ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 13, 20 (Harvard Univ. Press
2011).
29
Id.
30
See Rosemary J. Coombe, The Properties of Culture and the Politics of Possessing
Identity: Native Claims in the Cultural Appropriation Controversy, 6 CAN. J. L. & JURIS. 249
(1993); see also Fisher, supra note 27, at 171–72, 174.
31
See Keith Aoki, (Intellectual) Property and Sovereignty: Notes toward a Cultural
Geography of Authorship, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1293–1326 (1996); see generally LAIKWAN PANG,
CREATIVITY AND ITS DISCONTENTS: CHINA’S CREATIVE INDUSTRIES AND INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS OFFENSES 29–45 (Duke Univ. Press 2012).
32
See generally RICHARD E. NISBETT, THE GEOGRAPHY OF THOUGHT: HOW ASIANS AND
WESTERNERS THINK DIFFERENTLY…AND WHY 1–164 (Free Press 2003) (contending that cultural and
psychological research shows that East Asians and Westerners think about the world differently because of
differing ecologies, social structures, philosophies, and educational systems that date back to ancient
Greece and China); HANBAO MA, LAW AND TRADITIONS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINESE SOCIETY 47, 55–56
(Nat’l Taiwan Univ. 1999) (discussing the traditional Chinese legal culture).
33
Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11, at 95–112.
27
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specifically, classical liberalistic thought considers private property rights,
including IPR, as natural and inalienable. Under that view, therefore, rights
are superior to interests, and individual rights are more precious than
collective welfare, social harmony, and public order.34 In contrast, in China
individual rights carry a dark intonation of “self-interest” within the context
of Confucian teaching. “Entitlements” in traditional China are one’s share
of the communal interest as a whole. Communal interests and harmonious
relationships often are shared priorities, and individuals are expected to
sacrifice their own interests if the community requires it.35
In addition to Confucianism, contemporary Chinese justifications of
IPR are heavily influenced by the Marxist philosophy of dialectic
materialism and political economic analysis of IPR as forms of both
superstructure and ideology. 36 Marxism’s fundamental elements were
indoctrinated as the dominant philosophical and political ideology in China
by the political regime of the communist party—though subsequently the
party abandoned the idealistic goals and aspirations of socialism turning
China into a capitalist state.37 Moreover, stages of economic prosperity and
technology development in the United States and China vary vastly.
Quantitative research indicates that economic factors correlate strongly and
positively with both the numbers of IPR granted and IPR enforcement
strength in a nation. 38 Economic prosperity, especially high stages of
technology development, promotes the flourishing of businesses and trade

34

Randall Peerenboom, Let One Hundred Flowers Bloom, One Hundred Schools Contend:
Debating Rule of Law in China, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 471, 494 (2002).
35
HANBAO MA, supra note 32, at 55–56.
36
See generally JOHN R. SUTTON, LAW/SOCIETY: ORIGINS, INTERACTIONS, AND CHANGE
61–98 (Sanford Robinson & Cindy Bear eds., Pine Forge Press 2001); KARL MARX, CAPITAL,
VOLUME 1: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 53–210, 241–87, 486 (Ben Fowkes Trans., Int’l
Pub. 1967) (1887).
37
QU SANQIANG, QIESHU JIUSHI TOU: LUEN ZHONGGUO CHUANTONG WENHUA YU
ZHISHICHANQUAN [STEALING A BOOK IS THEFT: ON CHINESE TRADITIONAL CULTURE AND IPR] 73
(Zhishi Chanquan Chubanshe, 2006) (China).
38
See Jeffrey S. Schroeder, Rights Grantors and Rights Seekers: A Theory for
Understanding the Comparative Development of Intellectual Property Rights 238–56 (2001)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dept. of Political Science, Univ. of Oregon) (on file with the
Univ. of Oregon Library); see also MARTIN K. DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION,
LEGAL FRAGMENTATION, AND THE RULE OF LAW IN TRANSITIONAL ECONOMIES: THE
ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS LAWS IN CHINA, RUSSIA, TAIWAN, AND THE
CZECH REPUBLIC 120–74 (Stanford Univ. 2004) [hereinafter DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE
DECENTRALIZATION].
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associations with strong IP interests. 39 They provide the most direct and
powerful internal pushes for the protection of IPR.40 The United States has a
high stage of economic development and an advanced level of technology,
hosting numerous large businesses and industries that have strong IPR
interests and are active in business lobbying.41
China on the other hand experienced a period of rapid economic
growth in the past two decades, along with the gradual strengthening of
industries with strong IP interests.42 The tremendous regional disparities of
economic development in China create further obstacles to IP enforcement,
especially in regions that are experiencing a rapid economic boom but that
have not produced enough of their own IP products to raise their awareness
of IPR protection. 43 Finally, China does not have a tradition of legal
formalism;44 its judiciary emphasis on substantive justice contrasts sharply
with that of the relatively independent and powerful U.S. legal system. 45

39

See Schroeder, supra note 38, at 238-56; see also DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE
note 38, at 120–74.
40
See Schroeder, supra note 38, at 238-56; see also DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE
DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38, at 120–74.
41
For example, active and powerful trade associations in copyright-intensive industries
include the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Software and Information Industry Association
(SIIA), the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), and the Motion Picture
Association (MPA) of America. They play crucial roles in implementing U.S. copyright laws and
policies, both domestically and abroad. See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 35–76; see generally
CHRISTOPHER MAY & SUSAN K. SELL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY
(Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006); Joe Karaganis & Sean Flynn, Networked Governance and the
USTR, in MEDIA PIRACY IN EMERGING ECONOMIES ch. 2 (Joe Karaganis ed., Social Science
Research Council, 2011) (explaining how industry groups and business representatives “forum
shop” internationally for institutions where they can pressure for stronger IP protection measures;
domestically, they regularly attempt to coordinate various enforcement agencies to strengthen
enforcement), available at http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wpcontent/uploads/2011/06/MPEEPDF-1.0.4.pdf); Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Pharmaceutical Markets: A Nodal
Governance Approach, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 401 (2004).
42
See generally Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO OPTIMIZE
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais, ed., 2007) [hereinafter
Yu, Intellectual Property] (exploring the role of intellectual property protection in promoting
economic development in China).
43
Interview with Richard S. Gruner, Distinguished Senior Professor of Law, Whittier Law
School (June 23, 2010).
44
See generally STANLEY LUBMAN, BIRD IN A CAGE: LEGAL REFORM IN CHINA AFTER MAO
11-39 (Stanford Univ. Press 1999).
45
See generally SUTTON, supra note 36, at 99–132 (on the definition and theory of Max
Weber’s legal formalism); Stanley B. Lubman, Bird in a Cage: Chinese Law Reform after Twenty
Years, 20 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 383 (2000); LUBMAN, supra note 44.
DECENTRALIZATION, supra
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Politics and law are much more closely intertwined in China. 46 China
neither emphasizes nor seriously practices notions of judicial independence,
judicial review, and rule of law.47 The court as an institution is much weaker
than local governments, administrative agencies, and some other judicial
agencies, such as the procuratorate. 48 The procuratorate is the office of
prosecutors in China. China does not have a rational law system, where the
consistent and strict function of rules and procedures is highly respected.49
The Chinese government voluntarily transplanted Western law,
including IP laws.50 It was motivated by a set of historically determined
political goals: modernization of the nation, development of the economy,
introduction of foreign investment and advanced technology, maintenance of
market order, preservation of governmental stability, and restraint of local
government authority to strengthen the central state. 51 Thus, China
borrowed Western laws as instruments with whatever modifications are
necessary to fix Chinese indigenous problems.52 As a result, the Chinese
government can easily use the legal system, including IP laws and the
criminal justice system, to serve its policy priorities or state interests.53
This study centers on testing empirically the justifications and foci of
the criminal enforcement of IPR in China. Anglo-American IPR and IP laws
have swiftly transplanted to China despite those two societies’
fundamentally distinct philosophical worldviews, economic conditions,
political interference, and legal systems. 54 Given the context of IPR
enforcement in China outlined above, this article identifies the major results
of such an East and West collision at the criminal IP enforcement stage.

46

See Lubman, supra note 45, at 11-39; see generally LUBMAN, supra note 45 (reviewing
some of the major characteristics of Chinese legal institutions as they have developed since the
initiation of legal reform after Mao, including the unique characteristics of Chinese legal system).
47
See LUBMAN, supra note 45.
48
Id.
49
See generally SUTTON, supra note 36.
50
Zhu Suli, Political Parties in China’s Judiciary, 17 Duke J. COMP. & INT’L L. 533, 548–52 (2007).
51
Id. at 548–52.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW
IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 9–29 (Stan. Univ. Press 1995).
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Past Comparative IP Enforcement Studies

D.

Scant research exists on the primary concerns of U.S. businesses: IPR
enforcement itself inside China. 55 Most work on this topic concerns the
legislative history and legal analyses of IP legal codes in China, as well as
Sino-U.S. trade negotiations.56 This section first summarizes William Alford
and Peter Yu’s classical legal studies on IP protection and enforcement in
China.57 Then it turns to the more recent important empirical studies on IPR
in China conducted by Andrew Mertha and Martin Dimitrov from the
perspective of political science. 58 The literature review concludes with a
brief summary of the research on the criminal enforcement of IPR in both
the United States and China including the empirical criminological studies
done by Mark Motivans and Jay Albanese.59
Building on the groundwork Alford, Mertha, and Dimitrov have laid,
this article brings knowledge of the rapidly changing field of IPR
enforcement into the present. This article analyzes official U.S. datasets for
about half of the federal criminal IP cases occurring from 2002 to 2007. It is
thus far the most up to date and comprehensive quantitative study on this
subject. While previous studies concentrated on analyzing obstacles to
administrative enforcement, this article looks closely at the performance of
criminal enforcement agencies, the priorities of criminal enforcement in
55

INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ALLIANCE, 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPORT ON COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (PRC) 84–85 (2009), available at
http://www.iipa.com/rbc/2009/2009SPEC301PRC.pdf.
56
See generally Andrew C. Mertha, Pirates, Politics, and Trade Policy: Structuring the
Negotiations and Enforcing the Outcomes of the Sino-US Intellectual Property Dialogue 1991-99
(2001) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the University of
Michigan).
57
See ALFORD, supra note 54; Peter K. Yu, The Second Coming of Intellectual Property Rights, in
OCCASIONAL PAPERS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OCCASIONAL PAPERS 11, 16-26 (2006), available at
http://www.peteryu.com/2dcoming.pdf [hereinafter Yu, The Second Coming]; Peter K. Yu, The Copyright
Divide
(Mich.
State
Univ. DCL Coll. Of Law, Working Paper No. 1-21, 2003) available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=460740 [hereinafter Yu, The Copyright Divide]; Yu,
Intellectual Property, supra note 42; see generally Peter K. Yu, The Sweet and Sour Story of Chinese
Intellectual Property Rights, in TECHNOLOGY, PROGRESS AND PROSPERITY: A HISTORY OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY AND DEVELOPMENT (Graham Dutfield & Uma Suthersanen eds., forthcoming 2014) [hereinafter
Yu, The Sweet and Sour Story].
58
See generally MARTIN K. DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE: THE POLITICS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS IN CHINA (Cambridge Univ. Press 2009) [hereinafter DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE
STATE]; see generally DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38; see also MERTHA,
supra note 3.
59
See Mark Motivans, Intellectual Property Theft, 2002, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS (Oct.
2004); Beresford, supra note 2, at 73–74.
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action, and the forces shaping enforcement patterns. Taking a groundedtheory approach, this article is not confined to analyzing the impact of
political, institutional, structural, and bureaucratic factors on the
enforcement.
William Alford’s classical work elaborates on a rushed but vacillating
law-making process undertaken in China with the initiation of the Chinese
“economic reform (gaige kaifang 改革开放) policy under both internal and
external pressure. 60 It asked why, during thousands of years of civilization,
China did not develop anything similar to the Anglo-American IPR model.61
He suggests the answers stem from Confucian teachings that rules and ideas
come from nature, and in the critical role played by a shared past for moral
and intellectual elevation.62 The indispensability of communication with the
past requires free communal access to nature’s self-expressions recorded in
intellectual products.63 Alford’s research, however, focuses mostly on lawmaking and not on enforcement.
More recently, Peter K. Yu’s writings about the legislative,
enforcement, and policy-making aspects of IP laws in China also aim to
facilitate U.S. policy makers’ understanding of IPR from the indigenous
Chinese perspective and contexts.64 Andrew Mertha and Martin Dimitrov
concentrated on the impact of political models, administrative institutional
structures, and bureaucratic incentives on the effectiveness of IPR
enforcement, especially administrative enforcement. 65 Mertha rejects
Alford’s arguments concerning Chinese indigenous culture and social norms.
This research completes and updates Alford’s cultural arguments in
multidisciplinary contexts and examines them against empirical data. Alford
is correct that indigenous culture and social norms play a crucial role in
explaining why transplanted IP laws were ignored and marginalized by both
the public and enforcement agencies for decades after their introduction into
China. 66 Arguments based on institutional structures and bureaucratic

60

ALFORD, supra note 54.
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
See generally Yu, The Second Coming, supra note 57, at 16-26; Yu, The Copyright
Divide, supra note 57; Yu supra note 42.
65
See generally DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE, supra note 58; DIMITROV,
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38; see also MERTHA, supra note 3.
66
ALFORD, supra note 54.
61
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incentives alone cannot explain the exceptionally high rates of piracy and
counterfeiting in China.67
In terms of research on the criminal enforcement of IPR, there is
surprisingly little empirical study within the United States. 68 Intellectual
Property Theft and Fraud explores the definitions, impact, boundaries,
elements, criminological causes, and policy recommendations of the
problem as well as the relationship of IP theft to fraud, organized crime,
white-collar crime, and globalization.69 Incorporating government statistics,
Mark Motivans’ Bureau of Justice Statistics report summarizes the trends of
IP criminal and civil cases from 1994 to 2002.70 However, without solid
empirical data, most research in this book is exploratory.
Dimitrov’s study, Mertha’s analysis of sources of resistance and
barriers against criminalization is grounded solely in aspects of
organizational structures and bureaucratic incentives. 71 Literature on the
criminal enforcement of IPR in China is even scarcer. Dimitrov is the only
scholar who has conducted systematic empirical work to describe and
analyze the statutory bases, police structures, enforcement practices,
barriers, and aggregate official enforcement statistics on the criminal
enforcement of IPR in China.72 Successfully describing a large comparative
terrain, Dimitrov’s research on criminal IPR enforcement lacks the benefits
that a more targeted, in-depth analysis can offer.
III.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS, DATA, AND METHODS

China has swiftly transplanted a whole set of Anglo-American IPR
and IP laws despite those societies’ essentially discrete economic, cultural,
political, and legal contexts. The mainstream justification for IPR in the US
67

See BSA GLOBAL SOFTWARE, supra note 6, at 10-11; SIXTH ANNUAL BSA REPORT, supra note 6,

at 10-11.
68

See Motivans, supra note 59; see Beresford, supra note 2.
See Beresford, supra note 2.
70
See generally BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SUSPECTS IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL
MATTERS CONCLUDED DURING FISCAL YEAR 2002; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENDANTS
SENTENCED UNDER THE GUIDELINES DURING FISCAL YEAR 2002; BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
DEFENDANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES TERMINATED DURING FISCAL YEAR 2002. Motivans’ paper uses
the same type of U.S. official annual datasets that this research uses; however, his analysis only
covers the annual datasets up to 2002, and he only conducted basic descriptive analyses to reveal
the general trends of the annual data. Motivans, supra note 59.
71
See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 202–09.
72
See DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE, supra note 58, at 146–81; DIMITROV,
ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38.
69
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is to protect individual rights. This article hypothesizes that the main goal of
criminal enforcement of IPR in China is to repress activities seriously
violating “socialist market order.” 73 The above hypothesis is tested by
analyzing the types of IP infringements enforcement agencies focus on,
infringement victim profiles, objectives and targets of enforcement
operations, and surveys on the public perceptions of IPR, infringements, and
enforcement. Additionally, this article considers the factors determining the
patterns of the criminal enforcement of IPR in China and the United States
through in-depth interview and documentary analyses.
In order to test the above descriptive and explanatory hypotheses, five
types of empirical data were collected: (1) summary judgments of 376
Chinese criminal IP cases,74 (2) U.S. official annual statistics on about half
of all IP criminal cases containing rich individual case information, 75 (3)
news reports on 239 U.S. IP thefts,76 (4) aggregate official statistics on IPR
criminal and administrative enforcement in both countries,77 and (5) in-depth

73

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (97 Xiudin) (中华人民共和国刑法 (97修订)) [Criminal
Code of the People’s Republic of China (97 Revision)] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 14,
1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997) 1997 Order of the President of PRC No. 83, at ch. 3, § 7 [hereinafter Criminal
Code of the People’s Republic of China (97 Revision)].
74
The Chinese data analyzed comes from the databases of the summary judgments that
come from the largest publicized Chinese summary judgment databases. The author searched
various databases, including the Beijing University Lawyee website and Chinalawinfo.com. An
additional number of summary judgments were obtained directly from district courts. See
generally Zhanjian Tushuguan [Zhanjiang Library], Beida Fayi Anli Shujuku Jieshao [The
Introduction to Beijing University Lawyee Case Database], ZJLIB (2008), available at
http://www.zjlib.com/2008/bdfy.htm.
75
The U.S. datasets on criminal enforcement are located in the “standard analysis files”
(SAF) available from the Federal Justice Statistics Resource Center website. Among them, the
“Defendants Sentenced” files (data name: SC09OUT) from the U.S. Sentencing Commission has
been used for this research. See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENDANTS SENTENCED UNDER
THE GUIDELINES from 2002-2008.
76
Computer Crime & IP Section, CCIPS Press Releases, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/pr.html (last visited May 15, 2013).
77
The criminal enforcement component of U.S. enforcement statistics is located in the
Attorney General’s Annual Reports on the U.S. Department of Justice’s website. See 1999–2005
Intellectual Property Crime Report, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, available at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/publications.htm (last visited June 21, 2013). The aggregate official
criminal and civil case statistics from 1994 to 2002 can be found in Mark Motivans’s BJS report.
See Motivans, supra note 59, at 1–10. The Chinese IPR enforcement data mostly come from
governmental reports on aggregate annual IPR enforcement statistics. See generally GUOJIA
ZHISHI CHANQUAN JU [STATE IP OFFICE OF CHINA], 1998–2008 ZHONGGUO ZHISHI CHANQUAN
BAOHU ZHUANGKUANG [WHITE PAPERS ON CHINA’S IPR PROTECTION IN 1998–2008], available at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zwgs/zscqbps/ (last visited June 29, 2013); additional patent
administrative enforcement data is obtained from the patent administrative enforcement data
section of the State Intellectual Property Office of China’s website, and copyright administrative

152

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 1

interviews with IP practitioners in China. The first three provided the
datasets to analyze targets, roles, and consequences of criminal enforcement.
The author used aggregate statistics to verify the reliability of the three
datasets, and used the interviews to help interpret the statistical findings.
This article codes numerous variables from the Chinese summary
judgments into its analysis. The first set of variables includes victim
characteristics such as SOEs, domestic, or foreign companies. The second
set of variables categorizes types of infringements. These include: the types
of IPR; types and industries of merchandise; whether they are top
brands/copyrights or not; consumer products or luxury goods; and whether
the offense involves health, safety, governmentally controlled industries, or
other politically prioritized issues. The published summary judgments are
not a random sample and cannot be used for making generalizations to the
national population.78 Nevertheless, considering the particular scarcity of IP
criminal cases and the absence of other, more reliable data sources, the
sample of over 300 criminal IP cases offers valuable answers to the research
question.
This article additionally codes about 30 in-depth interviews conducted
in Beijing in summer 2010 with IP practitioners. The practitioners include
trademark and copyright agents, attorneys, judges, law enforcement
officials, law professors, and senior researchers who were knowledgeable
and experienced in relation to the topics of this research. The author
obtained informative interviews were obtained with several top officials at
copyright enforcement agencies and their research centers, with judges of
Beijing high courts and lower-level courts, and with researchers at the
Intellectual Property Center of the China Academy of Social Sciences.

statistics from the National Copyright Administration of China’s website. See generally GUOJIA
ZHISHI CHANQUAN JU [STATE IP OFFICE OF CHINA], 2006-2007 ZHUANLI ZHIFA SHUJU TONGLI
[2006–2007
PATENT
ADMINISTRATIVE
ENFORCEMENT
DATA],
available
at
http://www.sipo.gov.cn/sipo/zlgl/xzzf/ (last visited Sept. 1, 2008); GUOJIA GONGSHANG
XINGZHENG GUANLI ZONGJU [GENERAL ADMINISTRATION FOR INDUSTRY & COMM.] 1998–2009
ZHINGGUO GINGSHANG XHINGZHENG GUANLI NIANJAN [1998–2009 CHINA INDUSTRY & COMM.
ADMIN. REGULATION YEARBOOK] (Beijing Gongshang Chubanshe); GUOJIA BANQUAN JU [NAT’L
COPY. ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA], 2000-2006 COPYRIGHT ADMINISTRATIVE DATA, available at
http://www.ncac.gov.cn/GalaxyPortal/inner/bqj/include/list_column_bqtj.jsp?BoardID=304&boar
did=11501010111610&bqgbid=11501010111610 (last visited Sept. 1, 2008).
78
Lu Hong, Legal Responses to Trafficking in Narcotics and Other Narcotic Offenses, 18
CHINA INT’L CRIM. J. REV. 212, 219 (2008).
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The U.S. dataset is abundant in individual case and defendant
information. 79 It contains information on the vast majority of the felony
defendants of IP thefts in the federal criminal justice system, including those
plea-bargained, bench tried, and not convicted. About half of the IP
defendants were processed by the federal system each year. 80 The news
releases report collected from the website of the Computer Crime & IP
Section of the Department of Justice on a total of 239 IP criminal cases serve
as complementary data for the official dataset.81 These news reports provide
additional information on types of offenses, detailed crime descriptions,
victim characteristics, and investigation processes for individual IP theft
cases.
Finally, the aggregate official enforcement statistics outline a broad
picture of the case distribution and processing results across civil,
administrative, and criminal IP enforcement. They also show trends of
enforcement rates, sanction levels, and case attrition through these processes
and offer the starting point for comparison between the United States and
China.
The analyses of this study are conducted from two broad theoretical
perspectives: (1) law and society, and (2) enforcement and criminology. The
quantitative part of this research involves descriptive analyses of the data
(such as categorization, graphs, calculation of frequencies, ranges, and
central tendency) using statistical software SPSS and Access. Tables and
graphs are frequently used to help demonstrate patterns that emerged from
the results.
IV.

RESULTS

Statistical analyses of the three main case datasets and documentary
analyses address above research questions on the foci and roles of the
criminal enforcement of IPR. Statistical results partially support my initial
hypotheses that the role of criminal enforcement of IPR in China is to
prioritize public welfare and to serve some political goals such as repressing
activities that seriously violate the socialist market order. Results also
indicate several distorted and unexpected consequences in applying criminal
79

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEFENDANTS SENTENCED UNDER THE GUIDELINES,
SC02OUT (The Urb. Inst.), 2002-2008.
80
Motivans, supra note 59, at 4.
81
CCIPS Press Releases, supra note 76.
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IP law in China, and reveals patterns of similarities and differences between
the two countries.
A.

The Foci of Criminal Enforcement

Results from the descriptive analysis of the 376 IP criminal case
sample provides a nuanced picture of the roles and foci of enforcement
while indicating several unintended patterns of the enforcement in China.82
Part IV.A.1 reveals an extremely high concentration of protected victims in a
handful of economically or politically powerful companies in a few
particular industries.83 In terms of the corporate ownership in the Chinese
sample, 49% of the victims are SOEs and 44% are companies with
controlling foreign shareholders or foreign IPR.84 In particular, the protected
SOEs in the Chinese case sample converge in only a few industries: tobacco,
alcohol, and publication.
The profiles of victimized companies of foreign interests in the
Chinese sample are similar to the majority of victim profiles in the U.S.
sample. 85 In the Chinese sample, they are mostly foreign companies
carrying products such as home electronics, computer parts, personal care
products, software, and movies. In the U.S. sample, the victims concentrate
in industries with products such as software, movies, music, games, leather
goods, pharmaceutical products, home electronics, and computer parts.
Part IV.A.1 also reveals that the majority of infringed companies carry
nationally or internationally well-known top brands or copyrights. Finally,
in Part IV.A.3, the article compares the distribution of counterfeit
merchandise petitioned to the administrative agency in China to the
distribution of counterfeit merchandise in the criminal case sample.
Generally speaking, the distribution of consumer petitions is much more
widespread and diffuse.
Corporate Ownership, Industries, and Brands of the Victims

1.

Above all, statistical analysis reveals an extremely high concentration
of protected IP infringement victims in a handful of economically or

82
83
84
85

See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
See infra Part IV.A.
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politically powerful companies in a few particular industries. These
companies are large corporations with the biggest market shares in the U.S.
sample and large SOEs or companies of foreign interest in the Chinese
sample. The majority of infringed companies in the U.S. case sample are
either big domestic private companies or multinational corporations; many
of them are publicly held corporations. There are no SOEs in the U.S.
sample. In comparison, in the Chinese sample, 49% of the victims are SOEs
(which also include a few public institutions (shiye danwei 事业单位)86 and
44% are companies with controlling foreign shareholders or foreign IPR
(companies of foreign interests). 87 Domestic private and collective
companies constitute a very small proportion (6.7%).88
In particular, the protected SOEs converge in only a few industries,
whose markets are tightly controlled by the state and monopolized by SOEs:
tobacco, alcohol, and, to a much lesser extent, the publishing industries.89
Those frequently victimized trademarks include many nationally or
regionally renowned top tobacco and alcohol brands. The pirated books are
usually bestsellers, dictionaries, textbooks, and complementary material
published by state-owned publishers.
According to market demands, most of the pirated optical disks in
China are pirated movies and software, but they also include music CDs, TV
episodes, games, and other electronic publications.90 In terms of corporate
ownership, these pirated optical disks are very likely to contain best-selling
movies and TV episodes produced by state-owned movie studios or
domestic private movie companies as well as music released by state-owned
publishers.91 U.S. big cinema hits are also popular in China.92 Domestic

86

SOEs here are defined as companies dominated by state capital or state shareholders with
stockholding rights.
87
Companies of foreign interests are defined to include foreign companies, companies
carrying infringed foreign brands, and companies dominated by foreign shareholders with
stockholding rights, including Taiwanese and Hong Kong companies, brands, or shareholders.
88
See Table 2.
89
See Table 3.
90
Zhou Haibin, Fu Shidi, Hai Dandan & Chao Guodong, Guoyou Dianying zhipian Chang
Ruhe Niepan ( 国 有 电 影 制 片 厂 如 何 涅 槃 ) [How Will Chinese State-Owned Movie Studios
Transform?], CHINA ECON. WEEKLY 40 (Aug. 9, 2009), available at http://www.ceweekly.cn/html
/magazine/200989926156.html.
91
Id.; see also see also Guojia Xingwen Chuban Guangdian Zongju [State Administration of
Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television PRC国家新闻出版广电总局], Dianyingye Zhunru
Zaifa Xingling [New Provisions on the Requirements for the Entry into the Movie
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companies create or modify some of the best-selling software, but most
software is foreign.93
The victimized foreign companies in the Chinese sample share key
characteristics with the U.S. corporate victim profiles. In the Chinese
sample, they are mostly companies carrying top brands or copyrights of such
products as home electronics, computer parts, personal care products, as well
as foreign software, movies, and TV series on optical disks.94 In the U.S.
sample, the victims are highly concentrated in products such as software,
movies, games, satellite-TV access cards, leather goods, name-brand
apparel, pharmaceutical products, home electronics, and computer parts.95
Finally, in most industries, the majority of the infringed IPR is
concentrated in only a few well-known brands or corporations. In the U.S.
sample collected, the vast majority of the counterfeited products carry top
brands from big companies.96 The percentage carrying top brands in the
Industry电影业准入再发新令], Sarft.Qov.Cn（Sept. 21, 2004, 17:17 PM）(describing various
government policies that protect the market share and the development of state-owned
movie studios), available at http://www.sarft.gov.cn/articles/2004/11/21/20070910165506770372.
html.
92
See id. at 38.
93
See generally MICHAEL PECHT, CHINA'S ELECTRONICS INDUSTRY: THE DEFINITIVE GUIDE
FOR COMPANIES AND POLICY MAKERS WITH INTEREST IN CHINA 215-26 (2006).
94
See infra Table 3.
95
See infra Table 4. For example, the copyrighted products and company names repeatedly
mentioned in U.S. press releases on IP thefts frequently include the most commonly used software
of Microsoft, Adobe, Autodesk, Symantec, Macromedia, and Rockwell Automation; cinema hits
produced by the five major U.S. movie studios Columbia, Disney, Fox, Paramount, and Universal.
The pirated foreign copyright products in the Chinese case sample demonstrate similar
concentrations. The counterfeit trademarks repeatedly mentioned in the United States are leather
and luxury goods carrying brands such as Louis Vuitton, Prada, Gucci, Coach, and Chanel, namebrand apparel from Disney, Nike, and Tommy Hilfiger, pharmaceutical products from Pfizer, Eli
Lilly, Bayer Corporation, Hoffman La Roche, and AstraZeneca, and Cisco network cards and
connectors. In addition, the infringed foreign trademarks in the Chinese sample frequently are hair
care products from Dove and Procter & Gamble, network products from AMP, D-LINK, and
3COM, printer drums and cartridges from Canon, HP, and Toshiba, and cell phones from
SAMSUNG, Motorola, and Siemens.
96
See infra Table 2. The Chinese markets are not as concentrated as those of the United
States in general, except that certain home electronics, computer parts, and personal care industries
in China are dominated by a few top foreign companies. For example, the market share of hair
care products of Procter & Gamble Company in China has surpassed 40 percent since 1997. Wang
Fenmian, Baojie Riyongpin Diguo de Chen yu Fu (宝洁：日用品帝国的沉与浮 ) [Proctor &
Gamble: The Rise and Wane of the Daily Necessity Empire], PKU BUS. REV. (Sept. 2005),
available at http://business.sohu.com/20050926/n240455956.shtml.
In addition, as the
consequence of heavy regulation of markets at the regional level and local protectionism for tax
revenue, the tobacco and alcohol markets are highly fragmented, with numerous regional brands.
Dimitrov, supra note 27, at 244. In addition, because all optical-disk piracy cases involve
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Chinese sample is slightly lower: 89.7%. 97 The domination of namebranded products is especially prominent in trademark thefts, because the
demands for cultural products—such as CDs by various musicians—are
more diverse.98

Figure 2. Percentage Distribution of Ownership Type of Chinese
Corporate Victims99

numerous copyrights from multiple rights owners, each case is coded “1,” meaning that it carries
copyrights from top companies in the distribution calculation. As a matter of fact, most of the
pirated works do carry copyrights from top companies with the highest market shares, such as
movies produced by the top five movie studios and the most commonly used software created by
top software companies. However, the markets of pirated music and books are much more diverse
in nature. Zhang Zhiqiang, Zhuanxingqi Zhongguo Daoban Wenti Yanjiu [Piracy in China During
the Transition Period] 28–30 (2005) (unpublished Ph.D dissertation, Nanjing University, China)
(on file with author).
97
Id.
98
Zhang Zhiqiang, supra note 76.
99
N=162. The Chinese data come from the dataset of the summary judgments of criminal IP
cases in China from 1994 to 2009. The U.S. data used are the collected news releases on IP
criminal cases from 2002 to 2010.
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Table 2. Comparison of Victim Characteristics Between the Chinese and
U.S. Criminal IP Case Samples100
Percentage of
Victims Involving
…
China
United States

State-Owned
Enterprises

Companies of
Foreign Interests

Domestic Private
Companies

Top
Brands/Copyrights

49.4% (N=162)

44.4% (N=162)

6.7% (N=162)

89.7% (N=343)

0 (N=239)

Many Multinational
Corporations

Majority

Over 99%

100

The Chinese data come from the dataset of the summary judgments of criminal IP cases in China
from 1994 to 2009. The U.S. data used are the collected news releases on IP criminal cases from 2002 to
2010. See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju ( 国 家 工 商 行 政 管 理 总 局 ) [General
Administration for Industry & Commerce], Zhongguo Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Nianjian (中国工商

行政管理年鉴) [China Indus. & Commerce Admin. Reg. Y.B.] 1998-2009 (China Indus. and Commerce
Press 1999-2010).
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Table 3. China: Distribution of Infringed IPR by Industry101

Copyright

Number of
Cases

Percentage

164

43.7

pornographic optical disks

17

4.5

regular books

17

4.5

5

1.3

tobacco

58

15.5

home electronics and parts

31

8.3

alcohol

18

4.8

computer, software, and gaming products

14

3.7

personal care products

12

2.9

food

9

2.4

automobiles and parts

8

2.1

drugs and other medical products

7

1.9

construction materials

3

.8

agricultural resources and equipment

3

.8

apparel and leather products

3

.8

other products

3

.8

regular optical disks (software, movies, music,
soap opera, and games)

textbooks and complementary materials
Trademark

101

N=375. The Chinese data come from the dataset of summary judgments of criminal IP
cases in China from 1994 to 2009.
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Table 4. The United States: Distribution of Infringed IPR by Industry 102

Copyright

Trademark

Number of
Cases

Percentage

software or software titles

49

20.5

movies

36

15.1

music

14

5.9

games

10

4.2

satellite TV access cards

11

4.6

various copyrights (including all of the
above)

62

25.9

leather goods or name-brand apparel

20

8.4

pharmaceutical products

11

4.6

home electronics or computer parts

9

3.8

jewelry or luxury watches

3

1.3

agricultural products

1

.4

food

1

.4

various trademarks (mostly leather goods,
apparel, and jewelry)

9

3.8

other copyrights and trademarks

3

1.2

239

100.0

Total

Foreign IPR-Related Businesses in China

2.

Considering that the overall number of foreign-holding companies in
China is only 2.5% in 2012,103 the location of 44% of corporate victims with

102

N=239. The U.S. data used are the collected news releases on IP criminal cases from
2002 to 2010.
103

Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Tongjiju (中华人民共和国统计局) [Chinese Census

Bureau], Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian 2013 ( 中国统计年鉴 2013) [China Stat. Y.B. 2013] 27
(2013).
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controlling foreign shareholders or foreign IPR in the Chinese summary
judgment sample reveals a disproportionate concern with foreign interests by
enforcement agencies. In contrast, IP cases with foreign interests (including
corporate victims from Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan) concluded by civil
courts constituted only 5.8% of all 23,518 civil IP cases in 2008.104
Administrative agencies are much more likely to transfer an IP
infringement case to criminal prosecution when the case involves foreign
interests. For example, SAIC and Administration of Quality Supervision,
Inspection and Quarantine (“AQSIQ”) are the two major administrative
agencies that transfer the vast majority of counterfeit claims for criminal
process. In 2007, the prosecutors brought 796 trademark thefts indictments,
among which 229 cases were transferred by SAIC and 200 by AQSIQ. Out
of these 229 criminal matters transferred by SAIC, 43.7% were cases with
foreign interests. 105 In comparison, administrative cases with foreign
interests comprised only 24% of all trademark counterfeit and infringement
cases processed by SAIC in 2007.106
My interview with a former IP judge from the Beijing High Court
revealed that, according to an internal study that the judge supervised,
corporate complaints with foreign interests have a win rate of 71% in civil IP
cases, much higher than the average rate for all complaints.107 The judge
explained that the court gave certain preferential treatment to foreign
companies not only because of the pressure from foreign businesses and
governments, but also due to the Chinese cultural etiquette of treating
foreign guests nicely in order to gain face (zheng mianzi 挣面子) for the host

104

Guojia Zhishi Chanquan Ju (国家知识产权局) [State Intellectual Property Office of

China], Zhongguo Zhishi Chanquan Nianjian 2009 (中国知识产权年鉴 2009) [China Intellectual
Prop. Y.B. 2009] 111 (Intellectual Prop. Pub. House, China 2009).
105

Id. at 149; Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju (国家工商行政管理总局) [General
Administration for Industry & Commerce], Zhongguo Gongsang Xingzheng Guanli Nianqjian 2008 (中国

工商行政管理年鉴 2008) [China Industry & Com. Admin. Reg. Y.B. 2008] 729 (China Indus. and
Commerce Press 2009); See Zhongguo Zhiliang Jiandu Jianyan Jianyi Ju (中国质量监督检验检疫局)
[General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine], Zhongguo Zhiliang Jiandu
Jianyan Jianyi Nianjian 2007 (中国质量监督检验检疫年鉴 2007) [China Quality Supervision, Inspection
& Quarantine Y.B. 2007] 273 (Standards Press of China 2008).
106
See infra Table 5.
107
Interview with an IP judge (July 5, 2010).
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and build a good relationship. 108 This rationale may also explain why
administrative agencies, such as SAIC, transfer considerable counterfeit
cases with foreign interests for criminal prosecution.
Despite the high priority and favoritism administrative agencies and
judicial institutions give to IP thefts with foreign interests, detection of the
majority of cases relies on people outside of the legal system, especially the
corporate victims themselves. IP criminal cases are usually initiated through
the following channels: transfer by IP administrative agencies,109 initiation
by the police, 110 and victim complaints that go directly to court (private
prosecution111). The first two types of cases are brought to the court by the
prosecution, so both are public prosecutions. The criminal case sample the
researcher collected indicates that private prosecutions are rather
uncommon. Instead, most of the time, when a company detects theft of its
IPR it will report the crime to an administrative agency or the police and ask
for further investigation and public prosecution.
In the nine months between January and September of 2008, all
administrative agencies combined transferred 445 IP thefts to the Public
Security Bureau (“PSB”). This number constitutes 27.5% of all IP thefts the
PSB accepted for investigation.112 The remaining 72.5% of IP thefts were
either detected by the PSB itself or, most likely, directly reported to them.
Since IP thefts are not the priority of the PSB,113 one can infer that most of
the criminal IP cases were detected and reported by others, most likely the
victims, since IPR are private rights. Foreign corporate victims themselves
must have played a crucial role in pushing their cases for public prosecution.
Public surveys reveal foreign companies in China demonstrate much
higher consciousness of IPR and invest much more heavily in establishing
IPR management mechanisms when compared to SOEs and domestic private
companies.114 Interviews with several top-level IP attorneys and trademark

108

Id.
See supra note 104, at 109.
110
Id.
111
Private prosecution applies to criminal proceedings and is usually brought before a court
by an individual or private organization instead of a public prosecutor.
112
See supra note 99, at 104.
113
Gaikuang Xinxi (概况信息) [Profile Information], GONG’ANBU WANGZHAN (公安部网站)
[MINISTRY OF PUB. SECURITY], http://www.mps.gov.cn/n16/n1282/n3463/index.html?_v=140448
6441245140448644125 (last visited November 11, 2014).
114
See Zhang Jun & Yang Weiguo, Woguo Qiye Zhishi Chanquan Guanli Zuangkuang
Diaocha Fenxi [A Survey on the Corporate Management of Intellectual Property Rights], 1
109
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agents indicate that the vast majority of their clients are foreign
companies.115 Domestic private companies and SOEs, with the exception of
some top firms, either lack a specially allocated budget to pursue IP
infringements or would prefer to spend much less money to hire cheaper
agents or nonprofessionals.116
In contrast, top foreign companies are generally aggressive at
marketing and protecting their IPR. They hire top IP agencies or
investigative firms to proactively look for counterfeits or pirated goods.117
These attorneys and agents work to seek criminal—as well as administrative
and civil—processing when cases reach prosecution thresholds. 118 Given
such a high concentration of foreign companies as victims in trademark
cases, it appears a number of foreign companies are particularly active in
pressing for criminal prosecution of the theft of their trademarks and
securing the prioritizing of their cases by local criminal law enforcement.
Equipped with ample resources and extensive expertise, these IP
professionals can effectively facilitate governmental agencies in the
investigative and decision-making processes of their cases. Several
trademark attorneys commented that they expected to “do everything
themselves,” while cultivating good relationships with governmental
officials and enforcement officers.119
Some IP agents and attorneys from top firms in Beijing boasted of
their close personal relationship (guanxi 关 系 ) with enforcement agency
officials. Several former top administrative agency officials and judges were
hired as partners or counselors of these IP law firms.120 These firms provide
enforcement agencies with evidence or whatever legal or material (vehicles,
personnel, money, or other resources) assistance they need to facilitate
investigations. 121 Moreover, rights owners frequently have to pay case-

ZHONGUO FAMING YU ZHUANLI [CHINA INVENTION & PAT.] (Zhongguo Faming Xiehui he Zhishi
Chanquan Chubanshe, Beijing 2006).
115
Interview with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010); interview with an IP agent (July 6, 2010); interview
with an IP attorney (July 7, 2010).
116
See interviews cited supra note 115.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Interview with an IP attorney (July 7, 2010); interview with an IP judge (July 6, 2010); interview
with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010).
121
See interviews cited supra note 120.
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handling fees or treat enforcement officers with post-raid banquets and
entertainment in karaoke bars and massage parlors.122
Dimitrov harshly chastises these practices of “case-handling fees” and
special treatments as corruption that leads to “piecemeal, expensive, and
ineffective” enforcement. 123 Some of the interactions that result in
favoritism can be categorized as “clientelism,” in which “a sustained pattern
of reciprocal (and usually illicit) exchange [exists] between a state patron
and a non-state client based on personal ties and conducted via informal
networks.” 124 These acts may not all be corrupt according to the law.
However, “guanxi” and under-the-table payments could at least lead to
severely unequal treatment before the law and the capture of enforcement
agencies by a small number of rich and resourceful top foreign companies.
Some trademark agents and attorneys commented that the practices
noted above were so common they should not be considered corruption.125
These practices are necessary, as the reasoning goes, because enforcement
agencies with limited institutional capacity often hesitate to spend large
sums of tax-payer money to initiate preliminary investigations of less serious
infringements.126 IPR are usually considered to be just one type of economic
interest to be weighed against other interest by administrative agencies. As a
result, they are not always treated as a top priority. As long as the “casehandling fees” are collected by the organization and are spent to process the
case, instead of being treated as bribes by individual governmental officials,
they are not viewed as “corruption,” according to law.127
During my interviews, these trademark practitioners point out that the
banquet and entertainment activities are common Chinese ways of
networking to build relations with authorities. 128 Sometimes practitioners
have to pay the expenses of these social activities out of their own pockets
instead of out of the company’s account because they are considered
“personal expenses” spent socializing with friends. 129 Formal rules and
122

DIMITROV, PIRACY AND THE STATE, supra note 58, at 146–81; MERTHA, supra note 3, at

123

DIMITROV, ADMINISTRATIVE DECENTRALIZATION, supra note 38.
SCOTT KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS OF LOBBYING IN CHINA 128–59 (2005).
Interview with a government official in the National Copyright Administration of China (July 5,

165.
124
125

2010).
126
127
128
129

Id.
Interview with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010); Interview with an IP attorney (July 6, 2010).
Interview with an IP attorney (June 23, 2010); Interview with an IP attorney (July 6, 2010).
Id.
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procedures are often meticulous, bureaucratic, and slow. 130 Thus, legal
practitioners cut corners and seek favorable treatment through personal
networking.131 However, these extra-legal practices such as “case-handling
fees” and entertaining with enforcement officers might contribute to unequal
treatment before the law and the capture of enforcement agencies by a small
number of companies.
Foreign companies have quickly learned the Chinese way of doing
business and have enjoyed the benefits of these important personal
networks. 132 Large companies with ample resources and especially large
companies which are repeated players generally benefit more from these
unequal and extra-legal practices than they are hurt by them.133 In contrast,
these practices place individual infringers and small companies, especially
people from the lower class, the unemployed, or members of a floating
population, 134 at an apparent disadvantage. This pattern of winners and
losers in the process of IPR enforcement is clearly shown in the profiles of
the protected victims and convicted offenders in my case samples.135
Moreover, one could argue that the favoritism Chinese IP
administrative enforcement agencies and judicial institutions show to foreign
businesses results from intense diplomatic pressure, a means to attract
foreign investment and technology transfer, and an attempt to save the
government’s face before the international community. Of course, business
lobbying is more widely acknowledged, and has more legitimate channels,
in the United States than in China. 136 Still, the capture of the criminal
judicial system by a handful of rich and resourceful top foreign companies
and copyright trade associations is unjustifiable and unfair to other infringed
IPR owners who deserve criminal protection.

130

Id.
Id.
132
KENNEDY, supra note 124, at 96-127.
133
Id.
134
Floating population refers primarily to migrants in China without local household registration
status through the Chinese Hukou system.
135
See Liu, The Enforcement of IPR in China and the United States, supra note 11, at 251–
62, 274–75.
136
See generally TED NACE, GANGS OF AMERICA: THE RISE OF CORPORATE POWER AND THE
DISABLING OF DEMOCRACY 1-18 (2003) (on how the modern corporation seeks profit and power
in the United States by steadily bending the framework of the law and incurring destruction in its
path).
131
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Table 5. Yearly Frequency of Trademark Counterfeit and Infringement Cases
(shangbiao qinquan jiamao anjian) Processed by SAIC137

2008
2007
2006
2005
2004

Total
Number
of SAIC
Cases

Cases with
Foreign
Interests

Percent
with
Foreign
Interests

Transferred
for Criminal
Processing

Transferred
Cases with
Foreign
Interests

Percent
with
Foreign
Interests

47045
42314
41214
39107
40171

10944
10148
9286
6607
5401

23.3%
24.0%
22.5%
13.4%
13.4%

137
229
252
238
96

65
100
128
89
28

47.4%
43.7%
50.8%
37.4%
29.2%

Percent of total cases/
Percent of
Transferred Cases
with Foreign
Interests
0.49
0.55
0.44
0.36
0.46

Figure 3. Percentage of Cases with Foreign Interests out of Total
SAIC Cases and Percentage of Cases with Foreign Interests out of
Cases Transferred for Criminal Processing, 2004–2008138

3.

Aggregate Administrative Enforcement Statistics as a
Comparison

In addition to being overrepresented according to their market share,
luxury goods sold by the top corporations are overrepresented in criminal
enforcement vis-à-vis the administrative IP enforcement process. The SAIC
137

See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration for Industry
& Commerce] ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2003–2009 [CHINA
INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN. REG. Y.B. 2003-2009] 762-63 (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing 2004–
2010).
138
Id.
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processes consumer petitions submitted through the 12315 petition network,
detailed in Table 6. Most (59.4% in 2008) of these petitions were disputes
on product quality, which often involve counterfeits.139 This distribution of
petitioned merchandise is rather distinct from the distribution of counterfeit
merchandise in the Chinese criminal case sample listed in Table 3.
Generally speaking, the distribution of consumer petitions is much
more widespread and diffuse: a multitude of products belong to many more
industries. Some of them have significant shares among these petitions;
however, they do not appear in the criminal case sample. A variety of home
electronics, food, daily necessities, and household machines constituted
about 80% of all petitioned products.140 In contrast, tobacco, alcohol, hair
care products, and home electronics such as network products, printer parts,
and cell phones were highly overrepresented in the criminal case sample.141
Furthermore, as described at the end of Part IV.A.1, these criminally
processed counterfeits are greatly concentrated in top brands produced by
only a few leading companies in the industry (such as hair care products
from Dove, and Procter & Gamble brands such as Pantene and Rejoice);
while the distribution of infringed products reflected by the petitions is much
greater.142
Similarly, the distribution of counterfeits processed by the AQSIQ is
also rather distinct from that of counterfeits in the criminal case sample. The
top industries subject to counterfeits processed by AQSIQ in 2007 were
food, construction material, and agricultural resources. 143 Although there
exists a high concentration of tobacco, alcohol, and personal care products
counterfeiting among criminal trademark cases, tobacco-counterfeiting cases
make up only 0.2% of those processed by AQSIQ. In comparison, alcohol
and drinks together constitute 5.9%. Cosmetics and personal care product
comprise only 0.6% (see Table 7). Clearly the majority of counterfeits
processed by AQSIQ (59.5%) either carry health or safety threats (food,

139

See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration for Industry
& Commerce] ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2005–2008 [CHINA
INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN. REG. Y.B. 2005–2008] 172–73 (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing 2006–
2009).
140
Id.
141
See supra IV.A.1.
142
Id.
143
Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration for Industry & Commerce]
ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2003–2009 [CHINA INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN.
REG. Y.B. 2003–2009] (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing 2004–2010).
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construction material, personal care products, and automobile parts) or
involve other public welfare concerns (agricultural resources, cotton, and
other fiber products). 144 Finally, aggregate official enforcement statistics
show that administrative agencies handled the vast majority of IP
infringements each year; the proportion of IP cases processed by the
criminal judicial system comprise was just the tip of that iceberg.145
In contrast with trademark counterfeiting, the distribution of
administrative piracy cases is essentially similar to that of criminal copyright
cases in the Chinese sample. This finding is not surprising; piracy venders
carry numerous copyrighted works of a multitude of authors or producers
and they respond to market demands. Enforcement raids and seizures of
pirated goods can seldom specifically target a single type of product or
products of a particular industry.

144

Id.
For example, in 2007, the number of All Concluded Cases Involving IP Offenses was
only 2,684, compared to more than 100,000 IP infringements sanctioned by various administrative
agencies. Haiyan Liu, The Criminal Enforcement of Intellectual Property Rights in China: Recent
Developments and Implications, 5 ASIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY 137, 141 (2010).
145
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Table 6. Percentage Distribution of Industries of Consumer Petitions
(shensu) processed by SAIC through 12315 Web sites146
Year

Types of Merchandise Petitioned
Total
Petitions

Home
Electronics

Daily
Necessities

Food

Household
Machines

Construction
Materials

515543

199330

112766

64908

N/A

N/A

38.7%

21.9%

12.6%

N/A

Below 10%

208654

113666

63065

46607

26592

39.9%

21.8%

12.1%

8.9%

5.1%

218352

126490

60575

46399

26026

40.5%

23.5%

11.2%

8.6%

4.8%

199766

123250

93755

41919

27240

Percent

36.1%

22.3%

17.0%

7.6%

4.9%

More 2008

Agricultural
Production
Source

Medicine and Wine
Medical
(among
Items
Food)

Personal Auto
(among Household
Machines)

Others

17483

5407

6129

29820

44151

3.2%

1.0%

1.1%

5.4%

8.0%

2005
Percent
2006

522561

Percent
2007

539365

Percent
2008

Percent

146

552971

N=552971. See Guojia Gongshang Xingzheng Guanli Zongju [General Administration
for Industry & Com.] ZHONGGUO GONGSANG XINGZHENG GUANLI NIANQJIAN 2005–2008 [CHINA
INDUSTRY & COM. ADMIN. REGULATION Y.B. 2005–2008] 172–73 (Gongsang Chubanshe, Beijing
2006–2009).
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Table 7. Percentage Distribution of Industries of Counterfeit Cases Processed by
AQSIQ, 2007147
Industry of Infringed Products

Concluded Cases

Percentage

Food

44874

25.3%

(Among Food) Alcohol and Drinks

10501

5.9%

Construction Materials

35821

20.2%

Agricultural Resources

15723

8.9%

Cotton and other Fiber Products

4237

2.4%

Automobile Parts

3471

2.0%

Cosmetic Products

1111

0.6%

Fake Trademarks, Signs, or Packaging

587

0.3%

Tobacco

365

0.2%

Other

71466

40.2%

Total

177655

100.0%

B.

Differences and Unexpected Consequences of Enforcement

After comparing the subtleties of the corporate ownership, industries,
and brands of the infringed IPR, this research reveals patterns of similarities
and differences between the two countries. To summarize, despite the vastly
different macro-level factors and the big picture of rampant infringements
and ineffective enforcement in China, the profiles of victimized trademark
companies of foreign interests in the Chinese sample are very similar to the
victim profiles of the U.S. sample.
The industries of the infringed copyright products in China also are
rather similar to those of the United States. Most of them are optical disk
products with only two exceptions. First, 10.7% of the cases in the Chinese
copyright case sample involve pirated books; in contrast, the U.S. news
sample includes no book piracy. In 22.4% of these Chinese pirated book
cases, the products are pirated textbooks and complementary material, which
are an important target of Chinese law enforcement. Second, 6% of U.S.

147

See Zhongguo Zhiliang Jiandu Jianyan Jianyi Ju [General Administration of Quality
Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine], ZHONGGUO ZHILIANG JIANDU JIANYAN JIANYI NIANJIAN
2007 [CHINA QUALITY SUPERVISION, INSPECTION & QUARANTINE Y.B. 2007] 278–79 (Zhongguo
Biaozhuen Chubanshe, Beijing 2008).
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copyright thefts involve modification of a satellite television access card,
while Chinese state-owned TV stations do not seem to have pushed for the
criminal processing of such cases, despite the frequent occurrence of such
copyright thefts.148
This section elaborates on the major differences of criminal
enforcement in the two countries. Most importantly, statistical results
partially support my hypotheses that the role of criminal enforcement of IPR
in China is to prioritize public welfare and to serve some political goals such
as repressing activities violating the socialist market order. A substantial
percentage (44%) of Chinese criminal IP cases concern products with health
or safety risks, while only 9% of the cases involve such products in the U.S.
dataset. Moreover, 52% of Chinese trademark thefts and 11% of copyright
thefts involve products of regulated industries. Some of these industries also
involve SOE monopolization or domination, including tobacco, alcohol,
pharmaceutical manufacture, and book publication industries.
1.

Products with Health or Safety Risks

Important differences in terms of the enforcement foci remain
between China and the United States. Counterfeits raising health concerns
have become a prominent and notorious problem in China and occupy
tremendous attention of both the criminal and administrative enforcement
agencies.149 To put this in perspective, 19% of U.S. trademark thefts belong
to this category (see Table 8) while as many as 63% of the Chinese
counterfeit cases involve products that could cause health risks.150 Products
148

See supra IV.1.A.; See supra Table 3.
See CHEN CHUANYI (陈传意), TIANDI RENXIN: ZHONGUO DAIJA ZHILIE BEIWANGLU (天地人心: 中
国打假治劣备忘录) [Heaven and Hell in the Human Heart: The Memo of Cracking Down and Governing
Fake Products in China] 58–127 (2006) (China) (providing vivid narratives of cases of various counterfeit
drugs and poisonous food in China).
150
Counterfeits that might cause health concerns are inferior quality food (tobacco, alcohol,
salt, and other food), drugs and other medical products, dietary supplements, and personal care
products (hair care products and toothpaste). Counterfeits that pose potential safety risks include
automobiles, auto parts, construction material, and certain home electronics (relay sockets,
electronic wiring, and residual current circuit-breakers). Admittedly, not all counterfeit products
pose physical harm or health threats; for example, many food vendors counterfeit the more
marketable brands of others to increase sales, selling perfectly safe and healthy food. In addition,
the offense of Manufacturing and Selling Fake and Shoddy Goods charges are to specifically deal
with crimes involving health or safety threats; however, trademark offenses are sometimes used
either because they are easier to prove in court or because more than one charge is applicable. See
CHEN CHUANYI, supra note 149 at 58–142, 215-61.
149

172

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 24 NO. 1

with safety concerns do not seem to be as big a focus of enforcement in the
sample as those with health threats. After establishing the 2004 Intellectual
Property Task Force, the United States started to prioritize the prosecution of
IP cases involving threats to public health and safety.151 However, very few
of these cases have been prosecuted.
Although 44% of criminal IP cases in China concern products posing
health or safety threats—a sizable proportion of cases—only 47% of these
health or safety threat cases are actually tobacco and alcohol counterfeits.
Other equally serious types of IP thefts comprise much smaller
percentages.152 For example, all other food counterfeits make up only 5.5%
of all criminal cases carrying public welfare threats in China;
pharmaceuticals and other medical counterfeits constitute just 4.4%.153
China cracks down heavily on crimes that seriously undermine the
socialist market economy. Although IPR is defined mainly as a private right
in U.S. law, IP criminal offenses are considered crimes against the public in
China and are listed in the Chinese Criminal Code under “Chapter III
Crimes Undermining the Order of the Socialist Market Economy.”154 Thus,
this strong public welfare focus is a planned and unique characteristic of
Chinese criminal IP law.

151
See DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S TASK FORCE ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olp/docs/i
p_task_force_report.pdf; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROGRESS REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S
TASK FORCE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 1, 10, 21 – 22 (2006), available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/legacy/2006/06/22/ipreport61906.pdf;
EXECUTIVE
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE U.S., 2010 U.S. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT
COORDINATOR ANNUAL REPORT ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT 5 (2011), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/IPEC/ipec_annual_report_feb2011.pdf.
152
See infra Table 3.
153
Id.
154
See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingfa (中华人民共和国刑法) [Criminal Law of the
People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Order No. 83 of the President of the People’s
Republic of China, Mar. 14, 1997, effective Oct. 1, 1997), art. 3, §7 (China), translated in
http://www.npc.gov.cn/englishnpc/Law/2007-12/13/content_1384075.htm.
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Table 8. Comparison of Percentages of Cases concerning Products of Political or
Public Priorities between the Chinese and the U.S. Criminal IP Cases155
Percentage
Products
Involving …

Number
of Cases

Political or
Public
Priorities

China IP Thefts:

375

Copyright

Including…
Health
Concerns

Safety
Concerns

43.5%

27.7%

2.9%

28.3%

210

19.5%

0

0

10.5%

Trademark

165

74.5%

63%

6.7%

51.5%

U.S. IP Thefts:

239

8.8%

5.4%

2.5%

0

Copyright

178

0.5%

0

0

0

Trademark

61

29.4%

19.1%

8.8%

0

2.

Governmentally
Controlled Markets

State Regulation of SOE Monopolized Markets in China

The second unique aspect of the focus of IP criminal enforcement in
China is the heavy presence of SOEs among the corporate victims. In the
Chinese IP criminal case sample, 49% of the victims are SOEs, which means
that as many as 88.5% of the domestic corporate victims are SOEs.156 This
is a rather high percentage considering state-holding companies constitute
only 3.3% of all registered corporations in China in 2012.157 Additionally,
these SOEs converge in only a few industries (tobacco, alcohol, and book
industries) that are monopolized by SOEs and are tightly controlled by the
state. This unusually high percentage of SOE victims indicates that the
Chinese government has used criminal IP law to ensure state tax revenues
instead of protecting the private IPR of domestic companies. The state
pursuit of tax revenues through such unexpected means coincides with
Tamanaha’s argument that when law does not mirror a society, the law will
155

The Chinese data analyzed comes from the dataset of the summary judgments of criminal
IP cases in China from 1994 to 2009. The author searched various databases, including the
Beijing Univ. Lawyer, and Chinalawinfo.com. The U.S. data used are the collected news releases
on IP criminal cases from 2002 to 2010. Computer Crime & IP Section, CCIPS Press Releases,
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/criminal/cybercrime/pr.html (last visited May 15,
2013).
156
See supra Table 2.
157
Zhonghua Renming Gongheguo Tongjiju [Chinese Census Bureau], ZHONGGUO TONGJI
NIANJIAN 2013 [CHINA STAT. Y.B. 2013] 1, 27 (2013).
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be more subject to instrumental use by select groups, especially the
economic or political elite.158
While tobacco and alcohol counterfeiting can sometimes cause serious
physical harm, 159 tobacco and alcohol counterfeit cases receive far more
enforcement attention in comparison to other similarly dangerous crimes,
such as food counterfeiting. As a matter of fact, most counterfeit cigarettes
and alcohol do not cause worse health problems than do genuine products.
Most counterfeit or illegal cigarettes on the market are smuggled top luxury
brands or cigarettes manufactured by well-equipped underground
factories. 160 On the other hand, some are low-end cigarettes posing as
luxury brands.161 But even with these low-end cigarettes, only a very small
proportion is handmade or made with inferior quality tobacco. 162 Most
counterfeit alcohol products pose as top luxury brands while using either
low-end or homebrewed alcohol.163 Even so, extremely rare cases involve
deadly or poisonous alcohol.164
What is worse, the state frequently uses anti-piracy crackdowns and
the offense of Unlawful Business Operation to enforce media censorship.165
Although the majority of publications seized by the Anti-pornography and
Illegal Publications Office (APIPO)—the most powerful agency handling
antipiracy enforcement—are pirated, the designated responsibilities of
APIPO are to tackle pornography and illegal publications (sao huang da fei
扫黄打非) and regulate and macromanage the publishing industry. 166 Not
until 2003, and only under intense international pressure, did the APIPO and
Copyright Administration start to transfer more piracy cases for criminal
processing.167

158

TAMANAHA, supra note 20 at 235–36.
See CHEN CHUANYI, supra note 149 at 58–78.
160
Si Yu ( 思雨 ), Jia Yian de Jiben Leixing (假烟的基本类型 ) [The Basic Types of False
Smoke], REALLY100.NET (Apr. 13, 2010), http://www.really100.net/index_new/show_news.asp?id
=9342.
161
See CHEN CHUANYI, supra note 149.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
Id.
165
See MERTHA, supra note 3, at 202–09.
166
Id.
167
See LIU, supra note 11, at 137, 146.
159
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Additional Regulated Products in China

In the Chinese sample, 51.5% of trademark thefts and 10.5% of
copyright thefts involve products of government-controlled markets. 168
Although the U.S. government regulates certain industries out of various
public policy considerations, to some degree the strict government control of
markets is a phenomenon unique to the Chinese economy. The regulated
markets include most domestic pharmaceutical manufacture, tobacco,
alcohol, and book publication.169
In total, as many as 74.5% of the Chinese trademark thefts involve
infringed products either with public welfare concerns or in governmentally
controlled markets.170 In addition, 19.5% of the Chinese copyright thefts
involve products that are considered prioritized enforcement targets,171 such
as pornographic optical disks, textbooks, and complementary material.172 In
comparison, only 29.4% of the trademark thefts and almost none of the
copyright thefts in the U.S. dataset involve these prioritized industries, and
they are all counterfeits that could incur health or safety risks.173
The results in Part IV.B reveal that the role of criminal enforcement of
IPR in China is to prioritize collective interests and public welfare and to
serve politically prioritized goals such as repressing activities that seriously
violate the socialist market order.174 Previous findings of the foci of U.S.
criminal enforcement protecting top companies in a handful of industries
confirms that the primary goal of criminal enforcement of IPR in the United
States is to protect private property rights, especially the interests of large
IPR-intensive businesses.175 Since the overall enforcement of IPR in China
is highly proactive and is only one of their many responsibilities, the
enforcement agencies, including the criminal judicial institutions, have
tremendous discretion to select their enforcement priorities and reject other
cases. In this context, the overall strength, foci, and patterns of enforcement
168
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tell us much about the operation of institutions relating to IP enforcement
and the forces behind them.
V.

THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS

The analysis in the previous section reveals significant similarities,
differences, and unintended consequences of the indigenization of IP. The
following section considers how my findings contribute to an understanding
of IP crime and the criminal enforcement of IPR, and explores their
theoretical implications for larger issues of legal transplantation and legal
pluralism.
Beyond the questions on the characteristics, foci, and consequences of
enforcement in practice, what are the most important factors that determine
the major patterns of criminal enforcement in China and the United States?
Current analysis illustrates that various industry-level economic,
technological, political, situational and institutional factors are involved in
the criminal enforcement of IPR on the ground.
The nuances of Chinese criminal IP enforcement differ from what the
proponents of legal transplantation intended and are subject to the influence
of many mid-level situational factors and industry characteristics. In
particular, the narrow foci and evident enforcement patterns indicate that the
following forces have an overwhelming effect on criminal enforcement of
IPR in China: (1) vehement business lobbying by a handful of foreign
trademark corporations; (2) the size and market concentration of top firms in
an industry; (3) trade association lobbying efforts; (4) state tax interests in a
few industries; (5) public welfare and public policy concerns; and (6) other
political goals, such as control of the media and importation restrictions on
publications.
This summary of the forces behind the criminal enforcement of IPR
confirms David Sugarman’s views on the possible consequences of legal
transplantation when law does not fit in with the indigenous context. 176
When, in practice, the legitimacy of law is not acknowledged, decisions to
observe or enforce the law by citizens and state officials can be influenced
by numerous extra-legal factors.177 Under the influence of the six extra-legal
factors summarized above, a disproportionately high percentage of criminal
176
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IP enforcement in China involve a small number of foreign companies,
SOEs in particular state-controlled industries, products posing health or
safety threats, or other regulated industries, such as publishing.178
Foremost, the great similarities across the foci of criminal
enforcement in the United States and China described in Section IV.A.1
demonstrate that business factors are dominant factors not only for the
overall IP enforcement strength of a country, but also for enforcement
priorities. First, copyright-related industries are more active in using
associations to fight piracy due to the diverse nature of cultural and media
products and the suffusion of small businesses in these industries.179 When
comparing copyright thefts to trademark thefts, even a small-scale piracy
case tends to involve numerous pirated works, such as books or optical disk
publications of various producers and copyright owners. Thus, copyright
enforcement requires a collective business lobbying strategy by copyright
companies/owners acting through their trade associations or other copyright
collective-management organizations. 180 As Scott Kennedy’s study on
business lobbying indicated, industries full of small firms with low market
concentration and regular interfirm technical and business cooperation, such
as the software industry, developed more associations that functioned well in
China.181
In contrast, criminal-counterfeiting cases involving home electronics,
computers and parts, and personal care products concentrated in the top
brands of the largest firms in these industries as a result of vehement
lobbying activities of individual firms. Large foreign firms dominate these
industries in China. 182 Similar to the Chinese enforcement foci, in the
United States, the criminal enforcement of trademarks was captured by a
few of the most successful large firms in the following industries: leather
178
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goods, pharmaceutical products, home electronics, computer parts, jewelry,
and luxury watches.183
Further research reveals that large firms in highly concentrated
markets possessed ample resources and substantial clout to directly interact
with and influence governmental agencies, instead of relying on business
associations.184 The size of the chief firms and related market-concentration
level in an industry played crucial roles in shaping the mode of business
lobbying for that industry. 185 For example, the large size of top companies
in the consumer electronics industries enabled those firms to act more
aggressively when lobbying the government for favorable policies.186 The
tremendous impact these firms had on the local economy in a region gave
them considerable clout during negotiations with the local government.187
In trademark industries where large firms prefer direct contact with
governmental officials, the function of associations is limited.188 Unlike the
International Intellectual Property Alliance, the International Trademark
Association in China missed important opportunities to shape Chinese
trademark law at its critical lawmaking stages before 1993.189 As a result,
foreign companies carrying leading trademarks in China set up the Quality
Brands Protection Committee in 2000, which has lobbied at the ground level
and frequently updates Chinese governmental agencies in order to facilitate
the tackling of counterfeiting issues.190
In Chinese tobacco and alcohol industries, the function of trade
associations is almost irrelevant for anti-counterfeiting enforcement.
Tobacco and alcohol industries have low market concentration and are
permeated with SOEs of various sizes. Kennedy reports consistent findings
that the function of associations in the steel industry in China is marginal for
policy changes.191 Likewise, the steel industry is dominated by SOEs, which
183
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all have direct ties with the government. 192 As a result, these SOEs can
initiate negotiations on policy issues prior to the government’s promulgation
of policies.193
The dominance of business factors and the consequent similar
enforcement foci in the two countries verify Tamanaha’s arguments that
transnational commercial rules—including IPR—are founded on marketbased business factors and demands and not different national or local norms
and practices.194 Transnational commercial rules and trade associations are
created to advance business interests or to circumvent the state’s power to
control economic affairs.195
Political factors comprise the second most important determinants of
the foci of criminal enforcement in China. These include political
interference by the state to protect state tax revenue in luxury goods,
especially in the tobacco and alcohol industries, and public policies to fight
against counterfeits posing health and safety threats.196 What's more, strict
media control, and importation restrictions on foreign books, periodicals,
audio-visual publications, and other media products highly limits citizens’
access to these publications through the legal channel; pirates take full
advantage of this situation.197
Previous sections 198 of this article discuss the incentives and deep
cultural roots of these political factors. Political factors exert a strong direct
impact on the Chinese criminal judicial system due to the lack of judicial
independence and the close involvement of politics in law.199 On the books,
the criminal enforcement of IPR is a legal action that could be influenced by
legal factors and by administrative agencies’ structures and activities. This
empirical scrutiny reveals, however, that the actual foci of enforcement are
largely determined by situational-level business factors, political priorities,
and public welfare concerns.
Finally, technological development and digital publications and audiovisual products play a crucial role in changing the format of copyright
192
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infringements and enforcement foci. Since 2005, along with the dramatic
increase in internet access and the prosperity of web media, there has been a
rapid decrease in seized pirated publications on the street and increasingly
frequent and large-scale online anti-piracy crackdowns. 200 Case samples
from the two countries demonstrate a greater proportion of the
counterfeiting, marketing, and trading activities have also moved to the
virtual space.201
VI.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Analysis of counterfeiting and piracy problems in China illustrates
that current IP infringements arise in the context of entrenched economic,
cultural, political, legal, and institutional factors and interests. It is
unreasonable for foreign companies to expect enforcement agencies with
limited institutional capacity to make fundamental changes to the influence
of these macro-factors in a short period of time. Worse yet, ongoing rapid
criminalization and politically motivated enforcement crackdowns bring
little change in the context of these macro-factors, while at the same time
reinforcing social inequality and exacerbating problems embedded in the
criminal judicial system.202
Civil society and social activists have long worried about the
legitimacy of the aggressive expansion of levels and boundaries of IPR
protection globally. 203 Some IPR legal scholars, economists, and social
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activists argue there should be a fine balance between the “rights of IPR
owners and creators” and the “rights of users.” 204 That is, the balance
between offering economic incentives for more market-oriented creation and
lowering transaction costs to promote dissemination and public enjoyment of
the creation, which could in turn stimulate more creation. 205 Legally
speaking, Chinese law has granted IP owners comprehensive rights and
high-level protection as required by the TRIPS Agreement.206 These legal
changes are unlikely to be reversed given that the Chinese government has
been somewhat persuaded that these IP laws are beneficial for economic
development.207
Considering these public policy, social justice, and current
development points, the practical goal is to improve IPR protection while
reducing business capture, illegitimate state intervention, unfair and unequal
enforcement, and the consequent abuse of taxpayers’ money. To achieve
these goals, China must encourage and promote growth of the economy and
IP related industries, establish respect for rights and rules in general,
cultivate the IPR consciousness of right-owners and companies, encourage
the mobilization of private rights, allow citizen supervision of governmental
activities, and adopt reactive enforcement policies.
First, China needs to continue to encourage and promote the growth of
the economy and of IP-related industries. Some Chinese, including some of
the IP attorneys the author interviewed, believe that because of low
economic development and enormous regional disparity in China, it is
understandable that startup businesses would counterfeit top brands since
they lack adequate capital and retail chains to build up their own competitive
brands.208 As local businesses grow and become better able to establish their
own brands, society will become more trademark conscious, and the overall
counterfeit rate will drop. For example, there were several localities
notorious for their rampant local counterfeit markets and businesses in
Zhejiang Province. 209 Today, the local counterfeiting has declined, along
with the legal environment and the performance of administrative agencies
204
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that tackle infringements. 210 Empirical studies support the positive
correlation between economic and technological growth with IPR awareness
and protection at the macro-level.211 Obviously, it will take time for China
to build up its economy, develop its own brands, and overcome regional
disparities. However, for a country as vast as China, one needs to be aware
of the tension created by regional disparity and uneven development. 212
While economic growth could reduce piracy and counterfeiting, highly
uneven development sparked by economic growth might fuel piracy and
counterfeiting, at least temporarily.213
Second, to reduce infringements, the more effective solution than
proactive enforcement is to cultivate the IPR consciousness of citizens and
companies and encourage the claiming and mobilization of private rights by
private entities. Due to the vehement educational and propaganda
campaigns and highly publicized enforcement operations carried out by the
Chinese government after China joined the WTO in 2001, the majority of
Chinese citizens now seem to have some knowledge about IP, piracy and
counterfeiting activities, and the existence of IP law.214 Nevertheless, piracy
and counterfeiting are rampant, and an unusually high percentage of people
would not hesitate to buy pirated or counterfeit goods.215 It would not be a
quick task to cultivate the IPR consciousness of common citizens and to
establish their respect for rights and rules. Only large-scale and sustained
education and outreach programs for rights owners, the populace, and
especially the younger generation are likely to gradually reshape people’s
conceptions of IPR; though one has to question the legitimacy of attempting
to convert people away radically from their indigenous social norms. It will
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take at least a whole generation for new ideas and norms to be indoctrinated
into a new generation from their early years.216
Third, in terms of enforcement mechanisms, the Chinese government
should continue to use and promote reactive enforcement methods such as
the civil enforcement.
The central government has already been
experimenting to move from proactive administrative and criminal
enforcement to more reactive enforcement on a small scale.
One
interviewees from the China Academy of Social Science explained that civil
remedies were the main IP enforcement mechanism in most developed
countries, including the United States. In contrast, the dominance of the
administrative enforcement mechanism in China was a necessity because the
IP law transplanted by the state can only be proactively implemented on the
ground. 217 With the rapid increase of the institutional capacity of the
Chinese civil IP system, the central government realizes that the time has
come to shift from proactive enforcement to more reactive enforcement.218
This reform direction is consistent with the state’s reform goal to streamline
and simplify the government and focusing on providing services according
to the needs of businesses and citizens, as defined by the latter.219 One
reform emphasis is on reducing governmental power and functions—which
includes many IP-administering and anti-infringement responsibilities—that
can induce rent-seeking behavior out of agency self-interest.220
Small-scale experiments to slim down the enforcement teams of
various IP administrative agencies and combine at the local level have been
quite successful. For example, Shenzhen City established the Market
Supervision Administration of Shenzhen (Shenzhenshi Shichang Jiandu
Guanli Ju 深 圳 市 市 场 监 督 管 理 局) by combining the administrative
functions of the original SAIC, AQSIQ, Intellectual Property Office, and the
food and pricing supervision functions of the Food and Drug Administration
(Shipin Yaopin Jiandu Guanli Ju 食品药品监督管理局) and the Bureau of
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Health. 221 The Intellectual Property Protection Office (Zhishi Chanquan
Baohu Chu 知识产权保护) under the Market Supervision Administration
became the single office that protects and enforces copyrights, trademarks,
patents, trade secrets, and geographical indications all together.222 Despite
the substantial reduction in the number of administrative agency units, staff,
and as many as three quarters of the cadres, the administration and
protection of IPR were reported to have been strengthened after the
reform. 223 Similar experiments have been carried out in Chongqing City,
Fuzhou City, and Guangdong Province.224
Although the time seems ripe for promoting reform on a larger scale,
institutional and bureaucratic obstacles have been tremendous, especially in
the area of trademark administrative enforcement.225 The huge and powerful
SAIC, AQSIQ, and their local offices are unwilling to slim down, especially
since a great proportion of their cadres would be either demoted or
transferred. Both agencies are well-established, with substantial political
influence and powerful party leaders at the top; thus, their opposition is the
biggest reform obstacle. In addition, the Patent Office inside the State
Intellectual Property Office makes a reasonable argument that patent
protection is too complex and technical for its office to merge with other
enforcement teams.226
Fortunately, there are far fewer obstacles to reform in the area of
copyright enforcement in terms of switching from administrative
enforcement to judicial enforcement. 227 Copyright enforcement has been
sluggish and sporadic due to the very limited institutional capacity and the
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political salience of the Copyright Administration. 228 In addition to the
absence of bureaucratic obstacles, copyright officials tend to regard their
agency as a service institute for copyright owners instead of a proactive
enforcement agency.229 The officials know that one should not expand the
agency’s enforcement capacity just to strengthen its institutional power.230
Consequently, the numbers of IP infringement processed in civil courts each
year have expanded more rapidly than the annual numbers of administrative
cases. Hence, the overall direction of the reform of IP enforcement in China
is rather clear, but the expansion of such reform on a larger scale faces
tremendous obstacles. The central government needs to act in order to
overcome the political and institutional obstacles discussed in this article.
Fourth, Chinese citizens lack the power to supervise governmental
activities and to ensure the use of its enforcement powers serve state
interests only.231 The concentration of IP thefts in the tobacco, alcohol, and
publication industries speaks strongly to how easily the Chinese government
can intervene in the criminal judicial system and use various enforcement
resources in creative ways to blatantly work for state interests and to control
the media.232 Such abuse of public resources is unfair to taxpayers and to
IPR owners whose rights deserve criminal protection. Chinese citizens need
more effective channels to hold the government accountable and the
activities of the administrative agencies regulating these industries need to
be made more transparent.
Fifth, and most problematic, current punitive enforcement in these
areas does not address the roots of rampant piracy and tobacco and alcohol
counterfeiting.233 These problems are grounded in incentives embedded in
broader-level industry arrangements, political policies, and enforcement
institutions. Some of these problems call for large-scale reforms or a
fundamental overhaul of the system. Copyright enforcement cannot be
improved by a few sporadic and superficially result-oriented campaign-style
crackdowns each year. Local anti-piracy enforcement teams and civil IP
tribunals under the prefecture level should be established extensively to
228
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handle consistent, regular enforcement and implementation and to focus on
habitual offenders and large-scale infringements. The Chinese government
should open its restriction on the importation and distribution of U.S.
blockbusters and other foreign movies so people will not have such strong
incentives to buy or download pirated DVDs of foreign films.
Finally, China should establish monitoring mechanisms to regulate
corporate lobbying activities in order to prevent corruption and attempts to
capture the system. The Chinese government should have stricter regulation
of business lobbying, especially business lobbying in highly concentrated
markets and policy negotiations by SOEs. The purpose of such regulation
should not be simply to prevent and punish corruption. Rather, it should
monitor business capturing attempts and systematic unequal enforcement,
which exacerbate existing social stratification. Moreover, governments
should reserve a proportion of resources to protect the IPR of small
businesses and individuals, and the fair use and other rights of IPR users
given their rights have largely been disregarded by enforcement agencies.
If enforcing private IPR is not the priority of an enforcement team, it
might be reasonable sometimes for agencies to collect “case-handling fees”
to cover costs and to require assistance from rights owners. In such a case,
the fee should be standardized and the procedure should be transparent.
Otherwise, the fee could become a secret bid for prioritized enforcement
among multiple rights-owners and provide corrupted officials or agencies
opportunity to extract bribe from businesses and IPR owners. Lack of
regulation and transparency on these matters contributes to corporate clients’
serious dissatisfaction with the performance of enforcement agencies.234
VII. CONCLUSION
In sum, the narrow foci and obvious enforcement patterns that
emerged in the analysis indicate that the following forces have an
overwhelming effect on criminal IP enforcement in China: (1) vehement
business lobbying by a handful of powerful foreign trademark corporations;
(2) trade association lobbying efforts, including foreign associations exerting
external pressure; (3) the size and market concentration of top firms in an
industry; (4) state interests in industries regulated by the state and
monopolized by SOEs; (5) designated enforcement priorities, including
234
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public welfare and public policy concerns; and (6) other political goals, such
as control of the media and importation restrictions on publications. As a
result, a disproportionately high percentage of the protected IP theft victims
in China involves foreign companies, SOEs in state-controlled industries,
companies carrying health or safety-related products, and companies in
regulated industries (such as publishing).
Currently, the practical goals for China are to promote IPR protection
while reducing business capture, instrumental usage by the state, and
unequal enforcemen.t In order to achieve these goals, the root solutions are
to develop IP-related industries, to cultivate the IPR consciousness of
citizens to encourage the mobilization of private rights by private entities, to
allow citizen supervision of governmental activities, and to move from
proactive enforcement to more reactive enforcement. Other preventative and
monitoring mechanisms should also be established beyond enforcing IP,
such as stricter regulation both of counterfeits that pose health or safety
threats and of corporate lobbying activities to prevent corruption and capture
attempts. Expanding criminalization and intensifying criminal enforcement
will not effectively lead to better IP enforcement and would incur expensive
social costs and raise serious questions of justice.

